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MARITIME/CRIMINAL LAW-THE MARITIME EXCEPTION TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT FOR A WARRANT AND 
PROBABLE CAUSE-United States v. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. 
2573 (1983). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade witnessed a dramatic increase in drug smuggling 
from the sea. Law enforcement agencies countered by increasing ef­
forts to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. I A signif­
icant volume of arrests for criminal drug trafficking resulted. 2 The 
subsequent prosecution of offenders transferred a portion of the gov­
ernment's battle against drug smuggling into the courts. The six fed­
eral circuits having coastal territory within their jurisdictions have 
split over how broadly federal law enforcement authority may be exer­
cised without violating the fourth amendment. 3 Two statutes form the 
basis of federal maritime law enforcement authority: 19 U.S.c. 
§ 1581(a)4 which allows customs agents to board and inspect vesselss 
1. Drug Interdiction on the High Seas, 1978: Hearings on H.R. 10371 and H.R. 10698 
before the Subcomm. on the Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 103, 112, 119, 120 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings]. 
2. Id. at 103. 
3. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.5, at 130 & nn. 239-241 (Supp. 1984); 
Note, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537, 1538 
(1983). The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic­
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). The statute provides: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at 
any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be 
authorized, within a customs-enforcement area . . . and examine the manifest 
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or 
vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, 
and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary 
force to compel compliance. 
55 
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within the customs waters6 and anywhere in the United States; and 14 
U.S.c. § 89(a)7 which allows the United States Coast Guard to en­
force United States laws aboard American vessels on the high seas as 
well as in American waters. 8 Both statutes grant broad discretion and 
power to law enforcement agents in the field. The Supreme Court of 
the United States addressed the scope of this authority and the consti­
tutionality of § 1581(a) in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez. 9 
The Court faced the sole issue of whether the boarding of vessels 
for document and safety inspections lO in inland waters!! by customs 
Id. 
5. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982) defines "vessel" as "every description of water craft 
or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water, 
but does not include aircraft." 
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982) defines customs waters as a band of waters surrounding 
the United States 12 miles wide measured from the actual coast, or its equivalent baseline 
as defined in the statute, to an imaginary line 12 miles directly off the coast. Id. 
7. 14 U.S.c. § 89(a)(1982). The statute provides authority for the Coast Guard to: 
make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the 
high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the preven­
tion, detection, and supression of violations of laws of the United States. For 
such purposes, [Coast Guard] commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at 
any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation 
of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, ... ex­
amine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel 
compliance. 
Id. 
8. Id. International law recognizes four types of waters subject to varying degrees of 
control by sovereigns: inland waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the high 
seas. A sovereign completely controls its internal waters as it does a highway on land. 
Foreign vessels gain increased rights in each set of waters moving seaward with a corre­
sponding decrease in the control of the sovereign. See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 2.01-1 to 
2.10-10 (1983); 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j)(1982); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122-23 
(1923); Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment. 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56-58 
(1977). Originally the contiguous zone extended only 12 miles out from the coast contain­
ing both the territorial sea and the customs waters. See Convention on the High Seas, 
opened for signature April 29, 1958, Art. 5, 13 U.S. T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 
U.N.T.S. 83. Now, the United States, along with many coastal nations, has adopted laws 
to extend control of fisheries and resources out 200 nautical miles from the coast. 16 
U.S.c. § 1811 (1982). See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982). 
9. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
10. All United States vessels with propulsion machinery are required either to carry 
federal documentation or to have a state issued certificate of number. 46 U.S.c. §§ 1466­
67, 1469(a) and 1470 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-309 (West Supp. 1983). See Vi/­
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81. Generally, a document and safety inspection does 
not permit an overall search of a vessel. The inspection is limited to the cabin and area 
where documents are kept, the compartment where the beam number of the vessel can be 
verified, and the places where safety equipment is required. For a discussion of the permis­
sible scope of document and safety inspections see 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1O.8(f), at 
157-59. See also infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
11. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
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officers l2 under authority of § 1581(a),13 without any SusplClOn of 
wrongdoing is "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 14 The 
Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
holding that such boardings are permitted by the fourth amendment. IS 
This note focuses first, on showing that the unique circumstances 
of the maritime environment, combined with the historical back­
ground of § 1581(a),16 justify the Court's decision in ViI/amante-Mar­
quez; I7 and second, on considering its prospective ramifications. 
Although the fourth amendment generally requires both a finding of 
probable cause and a warrant for a search to be reasonable,18 a very 
limited number of narrow exceptions to these requirements exists. 19 
The warrantless and suspicionless boarding and inspection of a vessel 
in an inland waterway, however, does not fit precisely within anyone 
of these previously identified "specifically established and well deline­
ated exceptions"2o to the requirements for a warrant and probable 
cause. 21 The Court in Vii/amante-Marquez developed a separate mari­
12. Coast Guard officers are also "customs officers" under 19 U.S.c. § 1401(i) (1982) 
and 19 U.S.c. § 1709(b) (1982). Coast Guard officers, when enforcing a law, are deemed to 
be agents of the establishment responsible for administering that law. 14 U.S.c. § 89(b) 
(1982). 
13. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
14. Villamonte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2575, 2577 n.3 (1983). The Court, however, 
rejected a significant moot ness question in order to reach the issue of the validity of 19 
U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Id. at 2575-76 n.2. See also id. at 2582-84 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
15. Villa monte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2582. 
16. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
17. Villamonte-Marquez, \03 S. Ct. at 2578-79 & n.4. The Court's use of historical 
background is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions giving great weight to 
statutes passed by the First Congress. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The generally recognized excep­
tions to the requirements for a warrant or for probable cause or for both are the "stop and 
frisk" doctrine from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), exigent circumstances, Michigan v. 
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the "border search" doctrine, United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606, 616-22 (1977), administrative inspections, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 
(1981), the "plain view" doctrine, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971), 
searches incident to a valid arrest, Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and consent, 
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally 2 & 3 LAFAvE supra note 
2. 
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
21. The lack of a precise fit into previous exceptions and the ruling of Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1978), caused uncertainty and the split of opinion in the 
Courts of Appeal because after Prouse there were two possible results in the Villamonte­
Marquez situation. Either the maritime environment factors would permit the broad dis­
cretion granted under the wording of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982), or the land-based ration­
ale of Prouse would prohibit suspicion less boardings and require that officers have at least a 
"reasonable suspicion" of a law violation or that the vessel came from the customs waters. 
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time exception22 which met the balancing test of fourth amendment 
reasonableness by a combination of the administrative inspection ra­
tionale23 and the border search doctrine,24 applied to the unique cir­
cumstances of the maritime environment.25 The combination of two 
usually distinct rationales for warrantless searches logically created a 
resulting whole greater than either of the parts:26 the maritime excep­
tion granted broader authority than either the administrative inspec­
tion rationale or the border search doctrine alone. 
II. FACTS 
On March 6, 1980, customs officer Wilkins, accompanied by a 
Louisiana state police officer, boarded the sailboat HENRY MOR­
GAN II under authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)27 to inspect the ves­
sel's documentation.28 The HENRY MORGAN II was anchored in 
the Calcasieu River Ship Channel, a north-south waterway connecting 
the Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana.29 Customs Patrol 
Officer Wilkins had received some information provided by a reliable 
informant concerning possible drug smuggling by foreign vessels in the 
area.30 Although he suspected that the sailboat was foreign,31 he had 
neither probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion of a law violation 
before boarding the vessel. 32 Once aboard, the officer smelled burning 
marijuana and observed bales of marijuana through an open hatch.33 
See 3 LAFAVE supra note 2, § 1O.8(f), at 159-60. Additionally, the result of Villamante­
Marquez was not readily foreseeable. See id. at 160-6\. 
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2582. See alsa United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1306-07 
(5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing effect of the distinct maritime environment), cert. denied 448 
U.S. 906 (1980). 
23. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
25. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 
1303, 1311-16 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States V. Freeman, 
579 F.2d 942, 946 (1978). 
26. GREAT TREASURY OF WESTERN THOUGHT § 17-12 (M. Adler & C. Van Doren 
eds. 1977) (quoting EUCLID, ELEMENTS I, COMMON NOTIONS). 
27. 19 U.S.c. § 1981(a) (1982). 
28. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (1983). 
29. Id. 
30. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd 
103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The informant could neither describe the vessels, nor give their 
exact locations. Id. 
31. Officer Wilkens felt that the vessel was foreign because the person on board did 
not appear to understand English and the homeport "Basilea," painted on the vessel, was 
not known to be an American port. The occupant subsequently produced foreign papers 
during the document inspection. Id. 
32. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (1983). 
33. Id.. 
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Officer Wilkins then arrested the two men on board, respondents Vil­
lamonte-Marquez and Hamparian. A subsequent search revealed ap­
proximately 5,800 pounds of marijuana.34 A jury found the 
defendants guilty of various charges relating to possession and impor­
tation of marijuana with intent to distribute. 35 The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the boarding of the HENRY 
MORGAN II "not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment" be­
cause the officers boarded without a reasonable suspicion of a law vio­
lation. 36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a six to three 
decision, held that because of the special circumstances of the mari­
time environment and the lack of practical alternatives, the customs 
officers' actions were reasonable and, therefore, did not violate the 
fourth amendment. 37 
III. ANALYSIS 
The administrative boarding of the vessel clearly fell within the 
authority of§ 1581(a).38 The "plain view" doctrine justified the subse­
quent search. 39 The only question remaining was whether the suspi­
cionless boarding of a vessel in inland waters for a document and 
safety inspection met the criteria for an exception to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment.40 
A. The Administrative Inspection Rationale 
1. Historical Basis of § 1581(a)41 
Authority to search for stolen goods, contraband, or goods hid­
den to avoid paying customs duties has historically been considered in 
a different light than searches for private papers when the person, ve­
hicle, or vessel is reasonably suspected of having crossed the border.42 
34. Id.. 
35. Id. at 2577. The defendants were found guilty of violating the following statutes: 
21 U.S.c. § 963 (1982) (conspiracy to import marijuana); 21 U.S.c. § 952(a) (1982) (im­
portation of marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (conspiracy to possess marijuana with in­
tent to distribute); and 21 U.S.C. § 841(1)(a) (1982) (possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute). Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577. 
36. United States v. ViIIamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 488 (1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 
2573 (1983). 
37. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582. 
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). See ViI/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578. 
39. Villamante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3. 
40. Id. at 2578. 
41. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). See supra note 4 for the text of § 1581(a). 
42. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,617-20 (1977). Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). An early customs statute exempted searches of vessels for goods 
concealed to avoid duties from a warrant requirement while dwellings and buildings on 
60 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:55 
Also, the search of moving vehicles or vessels for goods subject to for­
feiture has been recognized as a valid exception to the requirement for 
a warrant because of exigent circumstances.43 Consequently, because 
of the inherent mobility of ships and the prospective haven of the open 
sea,44 no serious contention exists that warrants should be required in 
order to board vessels for a document inspection under authority of 
§ 1581(a).45 To require a warrant under these circumstances would 
only result in a "formalistic exercise."46 Entirely different and more 
difficult issues, however, involve how far inland these boardings may 
be conducted and the validity of the authority to board without prob­
able cause. 
The customs officers' authority to conduct warrantless inspec­
tions and searches stems from the first customs statute.47 The First 
Congress enacted this statute only two months before it proposed the 
Bill of Rights containing the fourth amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The statute's historical back­
ground, therefore, provides a strong indication that the First Congress 
did not consider such searches unreasonable.48 It then passed the di­
rect lineal ancestor of § 1581(a) to enforce these customs laws.49 The 
language of the statute has remained largely unchanged. 50 What was 
land could only be searched in the daytime and only with a warrant. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 
ch. 35, § 48, I Stat. 170 (repealed 1799). The present-day parallel provision for customs 
searches of buildings, 19 U.S.c. § 1595 (1982), remains distinct from 19 U.S.c. § 1581 
(1982). 
43. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
44. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580 (1983). 
45. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580; United 
States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 
1306-07 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). 
46. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1980). 
47. Act of July 31,1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790). 
48. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977) (reaffirming Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886». The Ramsey Court also reaffirmed the rule of 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925): "The Fourth Amendment is to be con­
strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was 
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and 
rights of individual citizens." Ramsey, 413 U.S. at 616-19 & n.14 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. 
at 149). 
49. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). The early statute was the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 
35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (repealed 1799). 
50. Compare Act of Aug. 4,1790, ch. 35, § 31,1 Stat. 164 (repealed 1799) with 19 
U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Before 1922, there was a limitation to boarding vessels in the 
customs waters "if bound to the United States." Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 
164 (repealed 1799). See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 n.4, and id. at 2586 n.7 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1310 & nn.8 & 
9 (5th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). Although section 48 of the Act of Aug. 
4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat 170 (repealed 1799) contained the wording "reason to suspect," § 31 
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considered reasonable at the time the fourth amendment was adopted 
receives great weight in applying the fourth amendment today.51 The 
early cases concerning boarding and search of vessels support this his­
torical construction by implication since the courts apparently as­
sumed the constitutionality of the boarding: the controversy usually 
concerned whether the government had sufficient justification to 
seize52 the vessel and its cargo. 53 
By enacting the first customs statute 54 and its first modification, 55 
Congress established a system of documentation for all sizeable Amer­
ican vessels and also regulated their movement in trade and fishing. 56 
Congress revised and expanded the system in 1793:57 the same basic 
framework remains today. 58 The regulations have become even more 
pervasive throughout the maritime industry for nearly all vessels of 
any type, whether used commercially or for pleasure.59 Recreational 
boats can also be used commercially: inspection of the documents pro­
vides the only viable method of distinguishing pleasure vessels from 
commercial.60 Additionally, pleasure vessels are usually not required 
to clear customs so the document inspection provides the only means 
of verifying that a vessel is not avoiding customs duties by posing as a 
did not. Act of Aug. 4,1790, ch. 35, § 31, I Stat. 164 (repealed 1799). Section 31 had only 
a possible limitation to vessels hound for the United States. The differences do not affect 
the authority for suspicionless hoardings because the two sections are separate and indepen­
dently enforceable. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 n.4. 
51. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977). See supra note 48. 
52. Although for fourth amendment analysis the hoardings are "seizures," United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), the use of the word "seizure" in the 
maritime context connotes a legal taking of the vessel rather than a brief detention, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979), because of the frequent exercise of in rem 
jurisdiction in admiralty law. See also 19 U.S.c. § 1594 (1982). For purposes of this note, 
therefore, the hoardings will be referred to either as an inspection or a detention. 
53. See Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1927); id. at 524 (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (expressing view that there was "no limitation upon the right of the sovereign 
to seize without a warrant vessels registered under its laws"); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 
559, 563 (1927). For an excellent review of the early law of at sea searches and Coast 
Guard jurisdiction, see Carmichael, supra note 8, at 55-59 (1977). 
54. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790). 
55. Act of Sept. I, 1789, ch. II, § 22, I Stat. 60 (repealed 1792). 
56. Id. American vessels over 20 tons were required to enroll and be licensed. Id. at 
60-61. Vessels over 5 tons were required to be licensed. Id. at 61. Owners of domestic 
vessels were to paint the name and home port on the stern. Id. at 56. 
57. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, I Stat. 305 (repealed \799). 
58. Brief of the United States at 17, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2573. 
59. Id. at 37-38. See e.g. 16 U.S.c. § 1861(b) (1982) (fishing); 46 U.S.C.A. § 3701-18 
(West Supp. 1983) (tankers); 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12106-109 (West Supp. 1983) (activity en­
gaged in). Customs document regulations specifically directed at foreign vessels apply 
while they navigate in United States waters. See e.g. 19 U.S.c. §§ 1431-1460 (1982). 
60. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81 & nn. 5-6 (1983). 
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pleasure vessel. 61 The term "maritime industry" would perhaps be 
more appropriately labeled "a narrow area of regulatory concern" 
rather than an "industry." The comprehensive nature of the federal 
documentation and safety regulations for American vessels, however, 
does meet the description of a pervasively regulated industry, provid­
ing the basis of the administrative inspection exception to the require­
ments for a warrant and probable cause.62 
2. 	 Validity of Warrantless Administrative Inspections Based 
on Less than Probable Cause. 
Beginning with Camara v. Municipal Court,63 the Supreme Court 
held that a lesser standard existed for administrative inspections in 
pervasively regulated industries than the "probable cause" standard 
used in criminal cases, provided that valid statutory authority for the 
inspections existed.64 When the legislature determined that a valid 
government interest justified the need for inspections in a pervasively 
regulated industry, it could then substitute reasonable legislative stan­
dards.65 Gradually but reluctantly66 the Court permitted inspections 
without a warrant. 67 The Court also considered whether obtaining a 
warrant would provide any additional notice or protection to the per­
son being inspected, and whether it would create an unnecessary bur­
den on the inspecting officials in view of the "implied consent" of 
persons engaged in an industry subject to pervasive regulation.68 
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,69 the Court rejected a warrantless 
inspection program based on the "implied consent" theory apparently 
because the program covered a large cross-section of many businesses 
rather than a narrowly defined area needing special requirements and 
regulations.70 The Court distinguished Barlow's in Donovan v. 
Dewey,? 1 which established the current standard for deciding the va­
lidity of a warrantless inspection under the administrative inspection 
61. 46 U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. § 12109 (West Supp. 1983). See infra notes 
100-102 and accompanying text. 
62. 	 See infra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
63. 	 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
64. 	 Id. at 534-35. 
65. 	 Id. at 538-39. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). 
66. 	 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33 (retaining warrant requirement). 
67. 	 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970). 
68. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); see Colonnade Catering 
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970). 
69. 	 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
70. 	 Id. at 313-15. 
71. 	 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
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rationale.72 The Court in Dewey outlined three criteria for a warrant­
less inspection without probable cause: 
(1) Congress must reasonably determine that warrantless searches 
are necessary to further a regulatory scheme; 
(2) the federal regulatory presence must be sufficiently compre­
hensive and defined, such that 
(3) persons engaged in that industry cannot help but be aware 
that their property will be subject to inspections undertaken for spe­
cific purposes. 73 
The facts of Villamonte-Marquez met the criteria: 
(1) Congress determined that warrantless searches were necessary 
to further the regulatory scheme by enacting § 1581(a),74 and the cir­
cumstances of the maritime environment made this determination 
reasonable·,75 
(2) historically pervasive documentation and safety regulation for 
vessels exists in the maritime industry,76 such that 
(3) persons who operated vessels with American registration or in 
American waters reasonably knew that their documentation was sub­
ject to surprise inspection by the customs and the Coast Guard. 77 
The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez and in other courts of ap­
peals cases raised the argument that customs or Coast Guard officers 
boarded the vessel under a pretext of making the document and safety 
inspections when their actual purpose encompassed searching for il­
licit drugs, thereby tainting the boarding. 78 This argument failed to 
recognize that customs enforcement cannot be readily separated from 
other documentation enforcement concerns without destroying the 
whole maritime documentation and regulatory system. 79 Further­
72. Id. at 598-606. See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2. § 10.2. 
73. See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600-03. 
74. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
75. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582. 
76. See supra notes 35 & 40-45 and accompanying text; United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606,616-17 (1977). 
77. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-122 (West Supp. 1983). See C. CHAPMAN, PILOTING, 
SEAMANSHIP AND SMALL BOAT HANDLING 34, 587, 598 (1971). Considering the extent of 
the regulations in the maritime area, a ship or boat owner "cannot help but be aware that 
his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." 
Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600. The Mine Safety and Health Act required inspection of all mines, 
and defined the frequency of inspection, and the standards for inspections were set forth in 
Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 604-05. 
78. See Brief for the Respondents at 12-14, Vil/amante·Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573; 
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845-846 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Watson, 678 
F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1983). 
79. See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1065 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied. 
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more, following the pretext theory would produce the nonsensical re­
sult of subjecting only law-abiding persons to the intrusion of the 
inspection while granting greater rights to suspected offenders.80 If 
the criteria for conducting an inspection were valid when the officers 
have no suspicion at all, then their suspicion of a criminal offense 
should not invalidate the inspection because there was no greater in­
trusion. If suspicions exist, however tenuous, of a violation of the stat­
utory scheme, there would be all the more reason to conduct the 
inspection. 81 As long as the inspection meets the statutorily author­
ized criteria, the inspection fulfills the fourth amendment's "reasona­
bleness" requirement. 82 The crux of the matter revolves around 
whether the concerns of the statutory scheme encompass suspicion of 
drug smuggling. Since foreign vessels are required to meet documen­
tation requirements under customs statutes,83 determination of a ves­
sel's nationality falls within the ambit of the statutory scheme. 
Importing a cargo of contraband remains a commercial activity. Vi/­
lamonte-Marquez involved first, a vessel possibly carrying cargo with­
out being licensed for commercial activity84 and second,· its 
prospective avoidance of reporting to customs and paying customs du­
ties. Both of these concerns are valid documentation considerations. 
446 U.S. 956 (1981); United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980). The 
Court in Vil/amonte-Marquez rejected the "pretext" argument. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 
S. Ct. at 2577 n.3. 
80. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3 (1983); United States v. Watson, 678 
F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 451 (1982); United States v. Arra, 
630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980). 
81. In Vil/amonte-Marquez the Supreme Court limited its decision to the narrow 
issue of whether a document inspection could be conducted without any suspicion of 
wrongdoing at all. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct at 2575 & n.2. Information from a 
reliable informant, however, created a suspicion that a vessel in the area was a foreign 
vessel attempting to smuggle illegal drugs. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 
481,482-83 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The regulatory scheme encompasses such 
concerns. See infra notes 63a-63c and accompanying text. Foreign vessels may only transit 
United States waters with appropriate documentation, 46 U.S.C. §§ 104, 313-15 (1982), 
and are subject to inspection while in the customs waters. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). The 
customs laws require manifests and proper licenses for various activities and provide en­
forcement authority and penalty provisions. See generally 19 U.S.c. §§ 1581-1626 (1982). 
82. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3; United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 
846 (1st Cir. 1980); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-39 (1978) (objective assess­
ment of officers conduct appropriate for fourth amendment analysis). The courts of ap­
peals have uniformly followed Scott in rejecting the "pretext" argument. Reply Brief for 
the United States at 2, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573. 
83. 19 U.S.c. § 1431 (1982). Some licensed yachts may not have to clear customs 
and carry a manifest but they are prohibited from carrying either merchandise or passen­
gers for pay and their status may be verified by inspection of their documents. See 46 
U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 46 U.S.C.A. § 12109 (West Supp. 1983). 
84. See 19 U.S.c. §§ 1431-1460, 1584 (1982). 
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Furthermore, since illegal commercial or income producing activities 
enjoy no special status in federal tax law, 85 logical consistency requires 
no advantage be accorded to importation of contraband. 
Yet, because "no act of Congress can authorize a violation of the 
constitution,"86 room still exists to question the validity of the broad 
scope of authority given to field officers under the statute. The amount 
of discretion granted by the clear wording of § 1581(a)87 is greater 
than ever recognized under the administrative inspection rationale. 88 
Section 1581(a) authorized customs officers to search any vessel at any 
time. The Court's concern in Barlow's, that persons would be subject 
to the "unbridled discretion" of law enforcement officers,89 weighed 
against the legitimate need for document inspection in the maritime 
environment rendering the balancing test extremely close. Further­
more, the ruling of Delaware v. Prouse90 apparently favored tipping 
the scales against the validity of the document and safety inspections if 
the inspections were supported only by the administrative inspection 
rationale.91 Similar to Villamonte-Marquez in that pervasive regula­
tion existed, Prouse differs because it involved the stop of a motor vehi­
cle on land where roads are clearly defined, and because it did not 
85. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled money considered as 
income). As in the area of federal income tax, the law should properly be amoral for vessel 
inspections and licensing. Whether a vessel is foreign or domestic has no real bearing on 
the authority to board and check a vessel's status; it need only be in the United States or 
within the customs waters. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). Congress requires American ves­
sels to be properly licensed and foreign vessels to clear customs and have a manifest if 
carrying a cargo. See supra notes 62a-63b. Whether a vessel is used exclusively for plea­
sure or carrying a cargo, contraband or not, if it is traveling within the customs waters then 
it is subject to licensing requirements and customs inspections. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-309 
(West Supp. 1983); 46 U.S.C. §§ 104,313-15 (1982). See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1626 
(1982). Logically then, under the regulatory scheme, officers may determine, by document 
inspection, if what appears to be a pleasure vessel is carrying a cargo, and if so, whether the 
vessel is properly licensed to do so. 
86. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). See also Vi/­
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578. 
87. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). For the text of the statute see supra note 3. 
88. See, e.g., Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603-05 (forcible entry prohibited and discretion of 
government officials limited); Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313-15 (OSHA inspection program re­
jected because of "unbridled discretion" given to field officers); United States v. Biswell, 
406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (limited to specific commercial establishments in a narrowly 
defined industry); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970) 
(limited to specific commercial establishments in a narrowly defined industry); Camara, 
387 U.S. at 532-33 (requiring warrants). See also Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2585 
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
89. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323. 
90. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
91. Id. at 661-63. See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1O.8(f) at 160-61. 
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occur near the border. 92 
B. Border Search Doctrine 
The applicability of the border search doctrine to Villamonte­
Marquez was also at issue because of the proximity of the Calcasieu 
ship channel to the border,93 and because of the broad language of 
§ 1581(a), which authorized inspections not only at the ocean border, 
but also nine miles beyond the border and anywhere within the United 
States.94 The border search doctrine states that at the border or its 
functional equivalent,95 law enforcement officers may detain and 
search without either probable cause or a "reasonable suspicion" of a 
law violation.96 
Border searches are not justified by exigent circumstances, but 
instead are "reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at 
the border."97 In land-based cases, the doctrine is strictly limited to 
the border or its functional equivalent.98 The Supreme Court has 
found warrantless stops by a checkpoint operation on less than prob­
able cause valid if held for a sufficiently limited and legitimate pur­
pose.99 Despite the broad authority of § 1581(a)IOO the fourth 
amendment would invalidate a comparable intrusion if applied to a 
vehicle stopped on land away from the border. WI 
In Villamonte-Marquez, the vessel was not located at the border. 
It was anchored in the ship channel, not at the port of Lake Charles, 
the designated customs port of entry which might be considered a 
92. Vii/a monte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2579-80. 
93. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
94. Id. For the text of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982) and a discussion of the included 
waters see supra notes 3, 5, and 7. The end of the territorial sea is the actual border and the 
customs waters extend nine miles beyond that line. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 
1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). . 
95. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). A functional 
equivalent of the border can be, for example, an airport receiving international nonstop 
flights, or an established checkpoint station near the border at a point marking the conflu­
ence of two roads extending from the border. Id at 273. 
96. Id. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618-22 (1977). 
97. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
98. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266,273-75 (1973). 
99. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-62 (1976); See also Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1979) (recognizing the validity of warrantless stops at a 
checkpoint operation). 
100. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
101. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-63; Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 
2579. 
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functional equivalent of the border. 102 The ocean border consists of an 
imaginary line on the sea,103 and ships are highly mobile and capable 
of crossing rapidly at any point. 104 Similar factors in a land-based set­
ting, however, have been held insufficient to justify general application 
of the border search doctrine away from the border. lOS The Vi/­
lamonte-Marquez maritime exception, therefore, does not fit clearly 
within any previous line of cases holding warrantless searches to be 
valid without probable cause. 106 Since a fourth amendment intrusion 
existed without clear precedent to follow, the balancing test used by 
the Court in Prouse 107 must be applied to the individual circumstances 
to determine the constitutionality of the government intrusion. 
C. 	 Determining the "Reasonableness" of Random Boardings for 
Document and Safety Inspections. 
The Villamonte-Marquez maritime exception fits best into the ad­
ministrative inspection rationale,108 yet Prouse, an analogous land­
based case, held similar governmental action unconstitutional. 109 
Prouse held that when government agents act within an exception to 
the warrant requirement, I 10 the fourth amendment issue rests on bal­
ancing the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment rights 
against legitimate government interests. I I I Only the unique circum­
stances of the maritime environment coupled with the sailboat's prox­
imity to the literally liquid ocean border distinguish Villamonte
Marquez from Prouse. 112 Accordingly, the best way to analyze the 
102. 	 103 S. Ct. at 2576, 2579 (1983). 
103. 	 United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1978). 
104. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cerro denied, 
448 U.S. 906 (1980). 
105. 	 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-84 (1975). 
106. The discretion granted in Vil/amonte-Marquez is greater than that recognized in 
any previous administrative inspection case, including Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594. 
See supra note 64. In land-based cases, the border search doctrine does not apply away 
from the border. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661-63. Also the "stop and frisk" doc­
trine, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), does not normally apply since usually no compara­
ble danger of concealed weapons to threaten the apprehending ship exists, absent a war or 
other highly unusual circumstances. 
107. 	 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. 
108. 	 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
109. 	 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
110. The boarding of vessels in most circumstances will be within a valid exception 
to the requirement for a warrant. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
III. 	 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. 
112. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Whitmire, 595 
F.2d 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1979) (the true border is an imaginary line three miles offshore), 
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). 
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Vil/amonte-Marquez holding is by comparing it to the Prouse decision 
to see whether factors exist in the maritime context which outweigh 
the fourth amendment concerns expressed by the Court in Prouse. 
Such an analysis reveals that the only concerns which invalidated the 
random stop of the automobile in Prouse were the availability of prac­
tical and effective alternatives to the action taken, the expectation of 
privacy that an individual has in his automobile, and the inapplicabil­
ity of the border search doctrine. 113 
1. The Lack of Practical Alternatives 
Along the coast of the United States, at the edge of the territorial 
sea, the border consists of an imaginary line which cannot be marked 
by a physical barrier. The short twelve mile band of ocean over which 
the United States exercises general customs enforcement jurisdiction 
can be traversed rapidly anywhere along thousands of miles of coast­
line. I 14 Additionally, outward appearance rarely alone indicates 
whether a vessel came from a foreign port or the high seas, or if it had 
contact with a foreign vessel. II5 So it would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to stop and inspect vessels at the border, 116 and no 
place exists that could practically serve as a functional equivalent of 
the border. While vessels eventually may enter inland waters where 
traffic could be funneled through a checkpoint, such a system would 
be ineffective. I 17 The increased danger of collisions and groundings to 
the majority of law-abiding ships and crews would also make such a 
practice foolish and costly as well as ineffective. I IS 
113. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655-63. 
114. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942,946 (5th Cir. 1978). 
115. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581 n.6 (1983); United States v. Whitmire, 
595 F.2d 1303, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). 
116. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
117. No equivalents to roads for checkpoints exist until ships are well inside the 
border of the territorial sea. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1315 (5th Cir. 
1979), cert denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). Vessels can easily discharge illegal cargo any­
where along thousands of miles of coastline and they need not return to port for extended 
periods. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. Furthermore, smugglers are gener­
ally well equipped. See International Narcotics Trafficking: Hearings Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 455. (1981) (statement of Senator Howard w. Cannon). The location of checkpoints 
would not be a surprise for long and could easily be avoided. 
118. A "roadblock" in a major ship channel would be somewhat hazardous at the 
best of times, and highly dangerous with heavy traffic and large ships. See A. KNIGHT, 
MODERN SEAMANSHIP § 9.20 (15 ed. 1977). Large ships are difficult to stop and, in re­
stricted waters, must stay within a narrow channel or run aground. Id. Even small vessels 
are constantly affected by wind, tide and current and cannot merely park by the side of the 
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Distinctions based either on the nationality of a vessel or its use 
would be impractical. Visual observation alone rarely provides 
enough information to determine either a vessel's nationality or its op­
erational status. 119 The United States has valid interests both in regu­
lating the movement of foreign vessels in United States waters and in 
enforcing the customs laws. Identification of vessels is necessary to 
achieve those -objectives. 120 Inspection of vessels at the dock does not 
present a viable alternative either. Ships with illegal cargoes may off­
load smuggled goods or contraband long before tying up at a pier, and 
smaller vessels often remove their safety equipment when moored to 
prevent theft. 12l 
The avoidance of customs laws, albeit of great importance, is only 
one of the underlying concerns in the maritime regulatory scheme. 
The scheme also encompasses vessel safety, traffic management, and 
pollution control which must be enforced within all United States wa­
ters, not just at the border. 122 Boardings to enforce these regulations 
are necessary because vessels have no license plates, and ships' mark­
ings do not provide the majority of the information contained in the 
ship's documents. 123 Nor is all safety equipment likely to be visible 
from another ship. A license plate system, although theoretically pos­
sible, would be expensive to initiate and maintain, and would discour­
road in safety. C. CHAPMAN, supra note 77 at 402-05. Most vessels would have to anchor 
if there were any delay at all, and this operation itself is time consuming and not without 
danger for larger vessels. See KNIGHT at §§ 5.8-5.10; CHAPMAN at 89-112. The combina­
tion of danger and ineffectiveness make such a practice impractical. To attempt a road­
block in the territorial sea or the customs waters would have similar problems. It would 
interfere with the normal flow of traffic, increasing the danger of collision, could be easily 
avoided, see supra note 89, and, to people aboard a ship, would look no different from a 
random stop. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
119. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. 
120. Id. at 2580-81. See also United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1314 (5th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations ...") is the source of Congress's power to enforce the 
customs laws and expresses a legitimate interest of the government. 
121. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Vil­
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. 
122. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. See also supra notes 49 & 54-59 and 
accompanying text. 
123. ViI/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580, 2581 & n.6. Depending on whether a 
vessel is federally documented, or state documented, or has no propulsion machinery, it 
may have a federal beam number, an exterior state issued number, or no markings at all. 
46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12309 (West Supp. 1983). Vii/amante-Marquez is therefore distin­
guishable from Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, because there is no license plate system available to 
provide easy access to the necessary information. Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580. 
Vessels' exterior markings do not provide sufficient data. Nor are ships subject to an inter­
national marking system as are airplanes. Instead, each country specifies its own marking 
requirements. Id. 
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age foreign commerce. Additionally, a license plate system could not 
realistically be enforced even against United States vessels because 
they may stay away from American ports for years. 
Formulating an effective system of regulation properly rests with 
the legislature. Congress enacted the current system authorizing 
boardings for document and safety inspection. As long as the legisla­
ture chooses a constitutional method, the availability of less intrusive 
means does not make a search or inspection unreasonable. 124 Addi­
tionally, in considering the validity of a fourth amendment intrusion, 
the Court has a duty to be equally concerned with upholding proper 
constitutional actions of law enforcement officers as well as protecting 
an individual's rights. 125 Vil/amonte-Marquez, then, is distinguishable 
from Prouse: The lack of practical alternatives to boardings, because of 
the maritime environment, properly received strong weight in the 
Court's decision. 126 
2. The Diminished Expectation of Privacy in a Vessel 
The individual's reasonable expectation of privacy provides one 
key element in balancing an individual's fourth amendment interest 
against the amount of government intrusion permitted. 127 In Vi/­
lamonte-Marquez, the balance turned on three determinations: first, 
whether vessels were inherently different in their use so as to have a 
lesser privacy interest than family cars; second, whether there was an 
unreasonable intrusion into a protected area, considering what areas 
124. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). Not since the Lochner era, 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), has the Supreme Court engaged in substantive 
due process analysis in considering economic choices of the legislature. See G. GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 517-18, 533-44 (10th ed. 1980). Substantive due process will be 
applied only where a Constitutionally protected individual right has been affected. See id. 
at 541-44. Here, although the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches is implicated, protection from a valid administrative inspection extends only to 
places in which a person has both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In a 
ship, only the private areas of the crew's quarters would qualify. See infra note 139. The 
government has a legitimate interest in inspecting the documents and safety equipment. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. It would make little sense to expend great 
amounts for little, if any, improvement in enforcement of the system. Many vessels rarely 
navigate in U.S. waters and Congress has not chosen to enact a license plate system. Id. at 
2581 & n. 5. Furthermore, the United States could not require foreign vessels to comply 
with a license plate sy~tem since by international agreement each country takes responsibil­
ity for regulating its own vessels. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 5. 
125. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1965). 
126. Vii/a monte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-82. 
127. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (One's reasonable expecta­
tion of privacy is the "touchstone" of fourth amendment analysis). See also id. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
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may be viewed during a document and safety inspection; and third, 
whether the legitimate objectives of the government to conduct the 
boardings were sufficient to justify the resulting intrusion. 128 
As to the first factor, people do not normally hop in the family 
boat to go to the store. People do not generally use even small plea­
sure boats in the same way they use family cars. Ships, therefore, 
should not be viewed in the same light as automobiles. The courts 
have found the automobile to have special status as a pervasive and 
necessary mode of travel,129 Unlike the situation in Prouse, the board­
ing of ships for document inspections does not constitute a new en­
croachment by the government. Ships and boats have been subject to 
document and inspection requirements at least since 1790. 130 Logi­
cally, therefore, the expectation of privacy in a vessel is less than that 
in the family carPI Another distinction from Prouse exists. The ap­
proach of Coast Guard vessels does not generate the fear produced in 
the average person unexpectedly stopped or approached by the police. 
Recreational boaters and persons familiar with the sea customarily ex­
pect and rely on aid from Coast Guard vessels in facing the hazards of 
maritime travel. 132 Customs vessels do not have the same lifesaving 
mission as the Coast Guard; I33 but the "fear" factor does not rise to 
the same level in the maritime environment. Ships are handled differ­
ently, moving as they do in waters which are less restricted than city 
streets. An approaching customs vessel would look the same whether 
its officers intended to board a vessel or merely to continue toward its 
destination. Furthermore, because no fixed roadways exist at sea, a 
128. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-82. See also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656-63. 
129. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63; State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982). 
130. See supra notes 35, 40-45 and accompanying text. 
131. See United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. de­
nied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 154-55 (Fla. 1982). The sailor's 
expectation of privacy is discussed infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. The special 
status accorded a motor vehicle because of its pervasive use is noted in Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
662-63. 
132. Search and rescue at sea is one of the primary duties of the United States Coast 
Guard. 14 U.S.c. § 2 (1982). Compare United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1313 
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (Coast Guard vessel a welcome sight as 
distinguished from the fear produced by police officers on land) with Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
657 (police approach results in fear), and U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894 (1975) (approach 
of police causes fear). Additionally, officers in charge of all vessels at sea, including cus­
toms vessels, are required by law to render aid at sea, and failure to do so constitutes a 
felony with a possible maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and a $1000 fine. 46 
U.S.C.A. § 2304 (West Supp. 1983). 
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1455 (1982) (customs officers' duties do not include search and res­
cue); 14 U.S.c. § 2 (1982) (search and rescue at sea is a primary duty of the United States 
Coast Guard). 
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"roadblock" located offshore would look no different than a random 
stop to persons aboard a ship.134 
The second factor concerns whether specific parts of the ship 
should be protected because individuals possess a legitimate expecta­
tion of privacy in private areas. I35 Although an argument exists that a 
sailor's ship is his home and that he is entitled to an expectation of 
privacy in the whole vessel,136 the more realistic view limits the inter­
est to the private areas and living quarters of the vessel. J37 Since the 
justification for the inspection is the enforcement of document and 
safety regulations, its scope should be limited to viewing those areas 
that either contain documents and safety equipment or that must be 
viewed to verify the validity of the ship's documents. 138 The crew of a 
ship generally has no privacy interest in the cargo hold; 139 the owner 
of the vessel has none in those areas which must be viewed to conduct 
a document and safety inspection, such as the cabin where documents 
134. See United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1982), cerro denied, 
103 S. Ct. 451 (1982). 
135. See supra note 127. For a discussion of the extent of a document and safety 
inspection see supra note II. 
136. United States V. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979). 
137. United States V. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
448 U.S. 906 (1980); United States V. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). But see 
3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 10.8(1) at 164-65. 
138. United States V. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978), cerro denied, 446 U.S. 
956 (1981) further addressed the Coast Guard's authority to conduct warrantless inspec­
tions without probable cause on the high seas. Although the issue of the amount of discre­
tion authorized by 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982) is beyond the scope of this note, at least the 
same amount of discretion would logically be permissible, based on the United States' obli­
gation to the rest of the world to enforce international standards of safety and laws aboard 
American vessels on the high seas. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. The limita­
tion imposed by the requirement to meet the standard substituted by the regulatory scheme 
would still exist. Stopping a tanker proceeding at 25 knots far from any border without 
some basis of suspicion appears unreasonable. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 
1063, 1085-89 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); United States V. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1147 (5th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980). Courts have held, however, that the Coast 
Guard's authority to board and search on the high seas is plenary. See United States V. 
Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1979). United States V. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 
1064-65 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1981). Since no other nation or 
authority may exercise jurisdiction over United States vessels on the high seas, the right to 
board and search may be the only practicable means for the United States as a sovereign to 
exert sufficient power and control over vessels flying its flag. See supra note 124. 
139. United States V. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). Mere legitimate 
presence in a vessel does not create a fourth amendment privacy interest. Rakas v. l11inois, 
439 U.S. 128, 148-50 (1978) (passengers in vehicle lacked standing for a fourth amendment 
challenge because they had no expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or under 
the seat, and rights of a third person had no bearing on the passengers' rights). See also 
United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 
(1980). 
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are stored and the engine room and other compartments which are 
required to have safety equipment. 140 Consistent with the basic princi­
ple that "the fourth amendment protects people, not places" 141 protec­
tion only extends to places in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.142 Logic would not allow invalidation of a 
search because law enforcement officers observe a law violation such 
as the contraband observed in Vii/amante-Marquez. The ~ett1ed rule 
provides that officers making a valid intrusion under a recognized ex­
ception to the warrant requirement may seize incriminating evidence 
which unexpectedly comes into "plain view."143 The doctrine clearly 
applies when an agent properly boarding a vessel to conduct a docu­
ment inspection smells burning marijuana and sees bales of marijuana 
on deck. l44 
The final factor encompasses whether the government's need to 
conduct the activity in question is sufficient to justify the intrusion. 
The various objectives of the regulatory scheme such as customs en­
forcement, vessel safety, and pollution prevention are clearly legiti­
mate. 145 Unlike Prouse, the method chosen reasonably effects the 
government objective and, as noted above,146 no practical alternatives 
to the current inspection requirements exist. 147 
3. 	 The Combination of the Administrative Inspection and the 
Border Search Rationales Permit the Maritime 
Exception's Broad Grant of Discretion 
In applying the fourth amendment balancing test to the maritime 
exception, a combination of factors from both the administrative in­
spection rationale and the border search doctrine weigh in favor of the 
exception's validity. The maritime regulatory scheme meets the the 
test of being a pervasively regulated industry; 148 the exigencies of a 
140. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. Foreign vessels are also subject 
to document requirements and inspections. See supra notes 83-85. For a discussion of the 
scope of a document and safety inspection see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. 
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
142. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
143. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). 
144. 	 See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2573, 2577 & n.3. 
145. Id. at 2581. See also supra notes 49, 54-59 and accompanying text. 
146. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 114-25. 
147. In Prouse, the Court found random spot check in question not to be sufficiently 
productive so as to justify the intrusion. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. In contrast, the docu­
ment and safety inspection remains the only effective means available in the maritime area. 
Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580-81. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. 
148. 	 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
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ship's mobility justify inspections without warrants; 149 and Congres­
sional authorization under § 1581(a)lSO stands undisputed. lSI Thus 
the Court properly applied the administrative inspection rationale to 
the Vil/amonte-Marquez document and safety inspection. Further­
more, although the border search doctrine may not be the primary 
justification for the document and safety inspections, the customs con­
cerns and the ease of border crossings in the maritime area highlight 
both the law enforcement agencies' need to inspect and the lack of 
viable alternatives. 152 The combination of the two underlying ratio­
nales creates a stronger exception, resulting in the maritime excep­
tion's broad grant of authority. The grant of broad discretion 
"requires caution in fourth amendment analysis, but it is not invaria­
bly fatal to the constitutionality of an intrusion."ls3 The long coast­
line of the United States and the practical concerns of enforcing the 
document and regulatory scheme in the maritime environment dic­
tates the need for this broad authority.ls4 Even though the authority 
granted by § 1581(a)lSS is broad, however, it is not without 
limitations. 
IV. LIMITS OF THE § 1581(A) MARITIME EXCEPTION 
The Court in Vil/amonte-Marquez specifically limited its holding 
149. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
150. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). For text of statute see supra note 3. 
151. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578. But see supra note 86 and accompany­
ing text. 
152. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. at 2580-82. Justice Brennan, dissenting, sug­
gests that laws controlling maritime smuggling can be adequately enforced by using a "rea­
sonable suspicion" standard and cites some successful prosecutions based on cases in which 
a "reasonable suspicion" existed. Id. at 2590 n.ll (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren­
nan's suggestion, however, fails to take into account that violations of the document and 
safety regulations often do not generate observable factors which would create a reasonable 
suspicion. See 3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 1O.8(t) at 163-64. Furthermore, he did not con­
sider the number and effect of violations which would not be detected if a reasonable suspi­
cion standard were adopted. Id. 
153. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1313 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
448 U.S. 906 (1980). Although a broad grant of power to law enforcement officials may 
result in some abuses, reason forbids acting on the belief that such power will automatically 
be used and abused to the fullest extent possible. Nor are the courts powerless to act upon 
any abuses which may occur. Evidence obtained by unreasonable searches may be in­
admissable under the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). More­
over, injured parties may file a claim against the officers themselves. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 
(1982). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing § 1983 
claims against federal agents). 
154. United States v. 146,157 Gallons of Alcohol, 3 F.Supp. 450, 455-56 (D.N.J. 
1933). See also Carmichael, supra note 8, at 101-03. 
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). 
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to the narrow issue of the boarding of a vessel for a document and 
safety inspection. 156 This holding does not permit an overall search of 
the vessel. It only allows an inspection which is limited to the cabin 
and area where documents are kept, the compartment where the beam 
or identification number of the vessel can be verified, and the places 
where the safety equipment is required. The beam number is usually 
found in the hold of a vessel,157 rather than in the crew or passenger 
quarters, so a document inspection does not subject protected privacy 
areas to a general search. 158 Additionally, most American pleasure 
craft are not federally documented, and bear only a state-issued 
number displayed on the exterior of the hull. 159 Neither the statute 
nor Vil/amonte-Marquez, therefore, authorizes an overall search of the 
vessel. l60 Any search beyond the permissible scope of the document 
and safety inspection would be invalid; its fruits would be subject to 
the exclusionary rule l61 unless the search can be independently justi­
fied otherwise. 162 
Finally, the Court's emphasis in Vil/amonte-Marquez on the 
ship's ready access to the open sea and the lack of practical alterna­
tives implied a limit on the exception. 163 The maritime exception ra­
tionale weakens as the vessel moves away from the open sea, thereby 
becoming less capable of ocean travel or contact. A reasonable suspi­
cion standard seems required, at least where viable alternatives to a 
warrantless inspection exist. l64 Ordinarily the further inland a vessel 
is, the less likely it made any border crossing or contact. It then fol­
lows that the border search justification would receive less weight 
156. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3. 
157. Reply Brief of the United States at 12, Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573. 
See also 46 U.S.CA. § 12116 (West Supp. 1983). 
158. United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. 
Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312-13, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980). 
159. 46 U.S.CA. § 12305 (West Supp. 1983). 
160. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575, 2577 n.3 (validity of suspicion less 
boarding for document inspection was sole issue presented). The authority approved by 
Vii/a monte-Marquez is logically limited to the scope of a document and safety inspection. 
Id. at 2582 ("type of intrusion made in this case, while not minimal, is limited.") For a 
discussion of the scope of a document inspection see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying 
text. 
161. Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
162. Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). This limitation may not 
be significant, however. In small boats a boarding may bring the whole interior of the boat 
into plain view, and in larger vessels the extent of safety equipment may allow viewing a 
significant part of the ship on a suspicion less basis. 
163. See Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580, 2582. 
164. See id. See also United States V. Williams, 544 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1977) (war­
rantless search of a houseboat held invalid). 
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since the government's need to protect itself would not apply.165 The 
federal regulatory scheme, however, encompasses many areas such as 
navigation, vessel safety, and pollution control which do not depend 
on proximity to the border and may properly justify inspection of ves­
sels far inland without reliance on the border search doctrine. 166 This 
reasoning would indicate that the Court may decide that the landward 
limit of the maritime doctrine should be the full extent of the naviga­
ble waters of the United States,167 the farthest reach offederal jurisdic­
tion over the inland waters.168 
V. CONCLUSION 
The intrusion of a short detention of a vessel and an inspection of 
its documents and safety equipment is justified under the balancing 
test of fourth amendment "reasonableness." The justification rests on 
(1) the need for an effective documentation and safety inspection pro­
gram to enforce the overall regulatory scheme; (2) the lack of viable 
alternatives; (3) the historically broad authority of Congress in regu­
lating foreign commerce; and (4) the magnitude of the government's 
vital interest in enforcing document requirements, particularly in wa­
ters where the threat of smuggling is great. 169 Villamonte-Marquez 
established no new powers for law enforcement officers beyond the 
authority granted under § 1581(a),I7° and will probably not affect cur­
rent enforcement procedures significantly, if at all. As a strong six to 
three decision, however, it removed most of the doubts about the va­
lidity of customs and Coast Guard authority for suspicion less board­
ings of ships. 171 
Should a challenge to the Coast Guard's analogous statutory au­
thority, 14 U.S.c. § 89(a),172 arise under similar circumstances, little 
doubt exists that the Court would reach a similar decision as long as 
the boarding begins properly as a document and safety inspection. 173 
165. The border search doctrine is limited to the border or its functional equivalent. 
See supra note 73. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1977). 
166. See Vii/amante-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. See also supra notes 49, 54-59, & 
79 and accompanying text. 
167. 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-25 (1983) defines the navigable waters of the United States. 
168. Id. at § 2.05-30. See also G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMI­
RALTY, § 1-11 & n.99 (2d ed. 1975). 
169. See Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582. See also supra notes 78-89 and 
accompanying text. 
170. 19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982). 
171. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
172. 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982). For the text of § 89(a) see supra note 6. 
173. See supra note 138. 
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If anything, the rationale for upholding 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)174 is 
stronger because of the long-standing recognition of the rights and du­
ties of sovereigns concerning their vessels on the high seas.175 Also, 
recent Congressional legislation increased Coast Guard authority 
against drug smuggling by closing a loophole in its high se~s authority, 
thereby indicating continued support of the established objectives and 
practices in the drug interdiction effort. 176 As broad as this authority 
seems, however, limits exist, particularly in waters well away from 
coastal areas. The right of freedom of navigation generally prohibits 
stopping foreign vessels on the high seas,177 and the best interests of 
the United States favor avoiding disruption of merchant vessel voyages 
without some basis of suspicion. 
Villamonte-Marquez also reflects the continuing trend of the 
Supreme Court in fourth amendment cases of upholding law enforce­
ment intrusions in limited areas where it finds sufficient justifications 
and safeguards for preventing abuse. 178 In light of this trend, the 
Court is not likely to reverse itself on fourth amendment issues. Future 
changes in the makeup of the Court by President Reagan more likely 
will strengthen the Villamonte-Marquez majority. The maritime ex­
ception, therefore, is here to stay. Future litigation in this area will 
probably concern only the limitations of the maritime doctrine, not its 
validity. 179 
Michael J. Devine 
174. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982). 
175. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 5. See 3 LAFAVE, supra 
note 3, § 1O.8(f) at 163. 
176. Act of Sept. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.c. § 955(a) (1982». This act closed a loophole left by the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 
1236, which had failed to reenact a prior provision of the drug control laws which made 
possession of controlled substances aboard United States vessels on the high seas an offense. 
177. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 8, at Art. 2. See also Carmichael, 
supra note 8, at 56-65. 
178. See generally Bloom, The Supreme Court and its Purported Preference for 
Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1983); Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and 
the Fourth Amendment; the Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 105 (1982); Note, The Erosion ofProbable Cause: Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1(1968), 13 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 212 (1982). See also. e.g.• United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) 
(containers within a vehicle subject to a warrantless search may also be searched without a 
warrant). 
179. But see 3 LAFAVE supra note 3, § 1O.8(f) at 168. 
